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CASE COMMENTS

Thus, the use of the injunction for the suppression of evidence
has become limited by recent constitutional developments. Its
future in some areas remains uncertain. The success of the remedy
will rest ultimately on the interpretation given the scope of Rule
41(e). Similarly, the granting of equitable relief in situations like
that in Bolger v. Cleary, supra, may depend upon the interpretation of state statutes providing no preindictment method for suppressing evidence.
Ellen FairfaxWarder

Evidence-Use of Learned Treatises in Cross-Examination
of Expert Witnesses
An action was brought on behalf of a minor, by his father
and next friend, to recover damages for allegedly negligent medical and hospital treatment which necessitated the amputation of
the minor's right leg below the knee. At the trial, the court
permitted cross-examination of the defendant's expert witnesses
concerning the views expressed in recognized treatises in their
fields, although the experts had not relied on these treatises as
bases for their views on direct examination. The trial court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Held, affirmed. The rule that an
expert can be cross-examined only about those texts upon which
he expressly bases his opinion is not supported by sound reasoning.
Expert testimony will be a more effective tool in the attainment of
justice if cross-examination is permitted as to the views of recognized authorities expressed in treatises or periodicals written
for professional colleagues. Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
It is the general rule that treatises are not admissible for substantive evidence purposes. This is due primarily to the fact that
they are composed of opinions and views of persons not under
oath and not subject to cross-examination and thus in violation of
th6 hearsay rule. 6 WiGMoBE, EvmENca §§ 1690-92 (3d ed. 1940).
The same reasons for excluding
been carried over into the area
witnesses. It is maintained that
examiner to present the contents

books on direct evidence have
of cross-examination of expert
this would enable the crossof the treatise to the jury as
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substantive evidence in addition to using it for the proper purpose
of contradicting or discrediting the testimony of the expert witness.
Willens, Cross-Examining the Expert Witness With the Aid of
Books, 41 J. Cmm. L. & Cmm.192, 197 (1950).
However, many courts feel that the hearsay objection is not
applicable to the cross-examination of expert witnesses because
the testimony of the expect on direct examination is based largely
on hearsay; consequently, it is only fair to allow the cross-examiner
to use similar sources in testing his familiarity with hearsay. Laird
v. Boston R.R., 80 N.H. 377, 177 Alt. 591 (1922). Furthermore,
the trial judge has broad discretionary powers as to how extensively
treatises may be used. It is urged that, where the cross-examiner
is trying to get the contents of the treatise before the jury as substantive evidence, the court will not allow the treatise to be used
for this purpose. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 210 Mass. 109, 96 N.E.
69 (1911). "We must assume as the result of centuries of practice
that a judge and jury can receive evidence for limited purposes
without applying it improperly." Laird v. Boston R.R., supra.
Most courts which do allow treatises to be used on cross-examination restrict this use. Four views have emerged concerning these
restrictions. 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958). (1) Some cases allow crossexamination by use of treatises on which the expert has relied
specifically in his direct examination. Hope v. Arrowhead & Puritas
Waters, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 222, 344 P.2d 428 (1959); Clark v.
Commonwealth, 111 Ky. 433, 63 S.W. 740 (1901). (2) Some
courts hold that, when the expert relies generally and specifically
on treatises, he may be cross-examined on authorities which were
not employed by him in forming his direct testimony. Farmers
Union Federated Co-op. Shipping Asin v. Mchesney, 251 F.2d
441 (8th Cir. 1958); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davies, 152 Ky. 600,
153 S.W. 956 (1913). (3) Other courts hold that the expert
may be examined upon the basis of treatises which he personally has recognized as having authoritative status, whether or
not he has relied upon them in his testimony. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 215 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1963); McComish v. DeSoi, .42
N.J. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964). (4) Still other courts endorse a
liberal view that an expert witness may be cross-examined with
any treatise established as authoritative by any acceptable method,
even though the expert has not relied upon or not recognized the
treatise. Superior Ice & Coal Co. v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc.,
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337 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1960); Faught v. Washam, 365 Mo. 1021,
291 S.W.2d 78 (1956).
The first group of cases, which holds that the expert must rely
specifically on the particular treatises before they may be used in
cross-examination, recently has been subject to much criticism.
In rejecting this rule, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 275 (1949), observed that, "It is
certainly illogical, if not actually unfair to permit witnesses to give
expert opinions based on book knowledge, and then deprive the
party challenging such evidence of all opportunity to interrogate
them about divergent opinions expressed in other reputable books."
Furthermore, this view favors the ignorant and unprincipled expert
over the honest and well trained expert. McCoRuMncx, EvmmcE
§ 296 n.3 (1954).
The second group of cases, holding that where the expert has
relied generally or specifically upon authorities, he may be attacked
upon authorities on which he did not rely, has been gaining wide
acceptance. This is the view recently accepted by the Supreme
Court in Reilly v. Pinkus, supra. The most recent adoption of this
rule was by the legislature of California. CAL. Evm. CoDE § 721
(Effective January 1, 1967). However, this view has been criticized
because its application will not let the cross-examiner use treatises
when the expert testifies solely on the basis of his own observation
and experience. It may be that these critics forget that the testimony of all experts, save possibly a few well known scientists, is
based on their learning as well as their experience. Hastings V.
Chrysler Corp., 273 App. Div. 292,296, 77 N.Y.S.2d 524,528 (1948);
3 Wic moRu, EvmmcF § 687 (3d ed. 1940); APPLE MAN, GiaossExAMNATON pp. 183-186 (1963).
The third view, which permits the cross-examiner to interrogate
the expert from treatises which the witness has recognized as
authoritative is conducive to the unprincipled expert. It gives the
ignorant and misinformed expert the opportunity to keep from
being contradicted and discredited by refusing to recognize the
book as an authoritative source in his field. Zubrypki v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 243 Minn. 450, 68 N.W.2d 489 (1955). Nevertheless,
many jurisdictions adhere to this view. In a relatively recent Virginia case, Hopkins v. Gromovsky, 198 Va. 389, 94 S.E.2d 190
(1956), the court held it was proper to cross-examine an expert
witness on whether or not he agreed with extracts read to him from
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scientific authorities which he recognized as standard on the
subject matter involved in order to test his knowledge and accuracy.
A few courts have adopted the liberal view which permits
authoritative treatises to be used on the cross-examination of expert
witnesses even though the expert does not recognize the authoritative status of the work and has not relied on treatises in his testimony. The modern tendency veers toward freedom of crossexamination of expert witnesses, but it is doubtful if many courts
will become this liberal. However, in Bluebird Baking Co. v.
McCarthy, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 466, 3 Ohio Op. 490, 36 N.E.2d 801
(Ct. App. 1935), there is a dictum that Ohio would permit the
cross-examination of experts with publications of writers of recognized skill and ability. The leading exponent of this liberal rule is
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. These rules would eliminate all
prohibitions upon the use of a treatise for purposes of cross-examination except those that would apply to the use of testimony by
another expert witness for the same purpose. Ulmuom Ruixs oF
EviD&.cx rule 61(31), comment (1953).
A diligent research has revealed no West Virginia cases on this
subject. One may ponder whether West Virginia will move to a
liberal view on the use of treatises in the cross-examination of
expert witnesses or adhere to the more conservative view requiring
the reliance of the expert upon or recognition by the expert of
learned treatises used in the cross-examination.
Menis Elbert Ketchum, 11

Federal Courts-Another Chapter To Erie
P averred that he was injured in the state of New York on
August 18, 1961, while using road building equipment manufactured
by D-1 and bought from D-2. He filed complaints in federal court
against D-1 on August 20, 1962, and against D-2 on February 13,
1964. Proper service of process on D-2 was not made until October
22, 1964. The basis of federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship. In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, D-2 contended
that the action was barred by the New York statute of limitations
in that such actions must be commenced within three years. The
law of New York is that such actions are commenced by service
of process, but an action is commenced in federal courts merely by
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